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Philosophy of Information is an active contemporary branch of philosophy,
dealing with problems in the analysis of the concept of information, in semantics, in the
study of intelligence, in the relation between information and nature, and in the
investigation of values[1]. There are many contributions about the ontological nature of
information, the definition of data and the philosophical approaches to semantic
information; one important publication is the review presentation of Floridi in Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy[2], where amongst others he introduces an extension of
Mathematical theory of Communication (Sannon’s information theory[3]) in the area of
semantics.
One of the open problems in philosophy of information presented by Floridi is
the problem of localization, whether information could be naturalized[4]. The
externalists / extensionalists (for example, Barwise[5] or Dretske[6]) have the difficult
duty to present how information resides in the world independently of the informee
and the sense under which an external object constitutes information. The internalists /
intentionalists (for example, Fodor[7],[8] or Searle[9]) have the opposite duty to explain
how the interaction between information and informee is exclusively an internal
cognitive operation, where the value of the external stimuli is negligible. We should
also mention here the nonmaterial objectivism, where the entities exist in an area
perceived only by human mind but not human senses. This is the philosophical position
emerging from Platonism, which continues to be today active usually in
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mathematicians’ and physicists’ views, where the ‘platonic’ patterns are mathematical
truths or universal physical laws. Lastly, another branch of philosophers
(constructivists) suggest that information is constructed during the learning process,
where both the individual and his environment participate.
Harnad has dealt extensively with the symbol grounding problem, posing the
question “How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be made
intrinsic to the system, rather than just parasitic on the meanings in our heads? How
can the meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens, manipulated only on the basis of
their (arbitrary) shapes, be grounded in anything but other meaningless symbols?”[10]
He suggests a hybrid non-symbolic / symbolic system, a "dedicated" one, in which the
elementary symbols are grounded in two kinds of non-symbolic representations[11]. It
is a bottom-up scheme of three representation levels: (1) non-symbolic iconic
representations, that is the sensory data, (2) non-symbolic categorical representations,
that is the concepts constructed within the human mind through abstraction of
individual sensory data, which become the elementary symbols and (3) symbolic
representations, that is syntactical combinations of the elementary symbols. These levels
also indicate the ground-up route from sense data to symbols, answering how the
meaningless higher order symbols borrow meaning from the elementary categorical
symbols on which they are grounded[12].
Following the hybrid dedicated symbol system of Harnad, information is not
internal in the strict sense (parasitic in the mind of the informee), but semi-internal,
grounded on semi-internal iconic representations (where both observer and observant
take part) and internal categorical representations produced by human conscience.
Trying to reduce the scope of the current investigation, focusing on digitally
viewed information, I select as working hypothesis, the “it from bit” theory[13], where
information is considered as the ultimate constituent of the universe and the natural
processes, including causation, are seen as special cases of information dynamics[14].
Based on this hypothesis, I will try to present a more radical view; that information is
placed neither in the external material world nor within us; instead, it exists in digital
form, as the constituent of a platonic type nonmaterial world.
In the Platonic allegory of the two worlds[15], the material world we perceive
through our senses, represented in Republic as a cave, is only a delusion; it is just a copy
or reflection of another world, which consists of ideas. The world of ideas is the true
world, which is accessible not by the senses, but by the mind. I introduce here an
informative version of the Platonic allegory, which I call Information Platonic Model. In
this model, information, in the form of innumerable combinations of two distinct states
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(bits 0 and 1), constitutes the true world, whereas material objects are reflections of
these information entities. Therefore, the true world consists ultimately of bits and what
we sense is only a transformed image adapted to our perceptual mechanism.
The above concern information as the background substance of anything. What
about the nature of the human-driven electronic information, the instruction codes
produced by human beings and the digitized data?
Writing an instruction code, according to a set of rules, could be considered as
the conclusion of a long evolutionary course. The natural environment itself avails
matter; through the evolution process various material forms proved to be successful in
the context of microcosms within the universe; a kind of them, human beings,
manifested the extraordinary capability of abstraction; based on it, after a lot of
discoveries and inventions, they designed and implemented mathematics, computer
arithmetic, and computer languages eventually used in computer programming.
According to the Information Platonic Model, matter is a phenomenon grounded on
binary information; the whole universe reduces to information; all material forms,
including human beings are reflections of binary entities. Under this perspective,
human beings are both expressions of digital material and producers of digital material, in
the form of instruction codes (software modules); these codes manipulate another form
of digital material – data - giving results, with a large impact on both human beings and
their environment.
How these two kinds of produced digital material - instruction codes and data are related to the ultimate background digital material? Are they human-driven entities or
independent ‘residents’ of another world, which are simply met and revealed by human
beings? We design and implement certain instruction codes in order to attain specific
results. We also sample and digitize texts, numbers, sounds, speech, music, photos,
pictures, videos, etc. In the context of the Information Platonic Model, where every
natural or artificial appearance can be ultimately reduced to combinations of 0 and 1,
there is no ground for observers or points of reference. Consequently, both computer
software and computer data, though they are human products, are neither objective,
nor subjective, neither random nor aimed. They are images of real and existing binary
entities of the true informative world, with not distinguishable nature from the other
material objects, including their ‘creators’. In this context, binary coded instructions and
data are not invented; they just manifest themselves from an upper level, where all
possible combinations of 0 and 1 of any length reside. Digital material under the cover
of human form meets again itself in the form of instruction codes and digitized data, as
the mythical snake that eats its tail.
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Another interesting element of any structure is the relations involved. What is
the nature of these relations expressed in the form of links? What is their role in the
Information Platonic Model frame? I think that they can also be considered as
reflections of real connections between real entities, revealing the dynamic ever-floating
structure of the true world of binary information.
2. A review of ancient classification schemata in respect to modern relationship types
Conceptual representations are extracted in human mind from the perceptual
data through the operations of discrimination and identification. We group a set of
similar observations, out of the total available observations, based on a number of certain
characteristics common in all the elements of the set. Then we give a label to the set to
be used as representative of any of the included observations. We create in this way a
number of abstract noetic entities – concepts - organized in a hierarchical structure of
classes. Each of the classes both belongs to a higher class, called parent class, and
includes a number of lower classes, called descendant classes, except the highest one,
which has no parent and the lowest ones, which have no descendants. The lower the
class, the larger its depth and the smaller its width. Each class takes the role of gender in
respect to its descendant classes and species in respect to its parent class.
The taxonomy of concepts in genera and species originates from Aristotle, the
philosopher who first systematized (1) the relations between concepts, (2) the structure
of propositions and (3) the types of admissible and non-admissible syllogisms in
Categories, Topics, Prior Analytics and Posterior Analytics. He considers individuals as a
distinct category of substances, calling them in Categories[16] primary substances, which
cannot be predicated of any subject. On the other hand all genera, called secondary
substances, can be predicated of relative individuals or descendant genera. For example
John is a man, man is an animal, John is an animal.
Aristotle continued the work of Plato, who was the first who spoke about the
noetic entities under the name of ideas (εἴδη or ἰδέαι) and introduced dialectics, the
practice of the division of concepts in successive classes in his earlier works Meno,
Republic and Phaedrus, and systematically in his later works Parmenides and Sophist.
In Meno, Plato introduces the term dialectical in the phrase “The more dialectical
way, I suppose, is not merely to answer what is true, but also to make use of those
points which the questioned person acknowledges he knows.”[17]
In Republic, he adds “we have set dialectics above all other studies to be as it were
the coping stone and that no other higher kind of study could rightly be placed above
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it”[18], and he gives the definition of dialectician as “the man who is able to exact an
account of the essence of each thing”.[19]
The human capability of abstraction is presented perspicuously in Phaedrus: “a
human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity by
means of reason the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recollection of those
things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its vision above
the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being. And therefore it is just that
the mind of the philosopher only has wings, for he is always, so far as he is able, in
communion through memory with those things.”[20]
Plato not only presents here the process of abstraction but he also declares
explicitly his position, in words of Socrates, that the concepts are not human creatures;
they exist independently of man in another world, and they can be recollected by man
through the operation of memory. With this phrase he opens a tremendous
philosophical subject, which has not ceased to be an object of study and conversation
until now, declaring that ideas exist independently in another level beyond material
world. The allegory of the cave in Republic[21] complements the above statement,
through the characterization of the material world as a mirror world of shadows. I will
refer to this classical Platonic position of absolute independent ideas as PhaedrusPlatonic, so that it can be distinguished from late Platonic positions in Parmenides and
Sophist that face critically that early position.
Later, in Phaedrus, he describes the practice of “perceiving and bringing together
in one idea the scattered particulars”[22], and he presents the opposite human
capability “of dividing things by classes, where the natural joints are, and not trying to
break any part, after the manner of a bad carver”[23]. His remark ‘where the natural
joints are’ is very interesting, since he stresses there that the art of division into classes is
a demanding task, taking into account the critical differences among the various
differences between the objects to be classified. Plato’s more detailed presentation of
classification structure takes place in Sophist, where he gives a detailed example of
defining the practice of sophists through successive division of concepts in further
narrower classes, in the form of a reversed tree[24]. I will refer to this Platonic model of
successive classes as Sophist-Platonic. This classification schema was adopted and
systemized later by Aristotle.
The correspondence between material objects and noetic entities was and still
remains a very demanding philosophical task. Aristotle tried to reduce the gap between
ideas and objects, considering that each individual (primary substance) possesses both
form (εἶδος) and matter[25]. I present next the attacks to the Phaedrus-Platonic position
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of absolute ideas both in Parmenides, within the words of Parmenides, and in Sophist
within the words of the stranger, which perhaps echo the beliefs of Plato himself in his
late philosophical considerations.
In Parmenides, young Socrates takes part in a very interesting dialogue with
Parmenides[26], the founder of Eleatic philosophy. Parmenides makes Socrates defend
his opinion about ideas. This task proves to be very difficult. The term used to denote
the relation between sensible things and distinct ideas is ‘participating’, (Greek terms:
μεταλαμβάνειν, μετέχειν). Parmenides takes the hypothesis of things’ participating to
ideas and leads it to the contradiction that anything participates to both the idea of
likeness and unlikeness[27]. Next Parmenides asks explicitly Socrates if he is the man
who invented the theory of the abstract ideas distinct from the things that participate to
them. And he complements the question, asking him if he considers abstract likeness
apart from the likeness we possess[28]. By the positive answer of Socrates, Plato
presents him explicitly as the introducer of the fundamental philosophical position,
which I called before as Phaedrus-Platonic position. Parmenides does in this point his
direct attack to this theory, asking Socrates whether there exists an abstract idea of man
apart from each individual person, a distinct idea of fire or a distinct idea of water.
Socrates declares that he cannot answer[29]. Then, Parmenides encouraged extends his
critique against distinct ideas, asking Socrates whether there exist ideas of ridiculous
things, like hair, mud, dirt, or anything else vile and worthless. Socrates answers
negatively, saying that he prefers to deal with the important ideas he is sure to exist[30].
This debate reveals the nonsense brought out through the careless extension of a
reasonable position. Next, Parmenides uses the trick of the division of an idea into
parts, to show that participating to the ideas of smallness, equality or greatness either to
the whole or to a part of them lead to contradictions[31]. Then Socrates tries to escape
by supporting the possibility that each of these ideas of quantity “may be only a
thought, which can exist only in our minds”[32]. This is a very interesting reference that
shows that the modern opinion that ideas are but human concepts, residing only in
human minds, was not excluded, concerning some ideas, even by Socrates (either
Socrates himself or Platonic Socrates), the introducer of the model of distinct ideas. But,
later Socrates returns to add an important characteristic of the ideas, their operation as
patterns (Greek word παραδείγματα): “ideas exist in nature as patterns, and the other
things resemble them and are imitations of them; their participation in ideas is
assimilation to them, that and nothing else.[33]” The ideas as patterns and the
participation as a course of assimilation are important components of the traditional
Phaedrus-Platonic position. Neither this position remains invulnerable, as Parmenides
shows that such a position leads to an infinite series of ideas related to a certain
thing[34]. Later Parmenides addressing to Socrates, says: “I think that you or anyone
else who claims that there is an absolute idea of each thing would agree in the first place
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that none of them exists in us”[35], where Socrates agrees with this thesis. It is the most
perspicuous declaration of Phaedrus -Platonic position that the ideas are absolute and
they do not exist in us. This position is then seriously attacked by Parmenides, who
shows that this opinion leads to the incapability of human beings to know the ideas[36].
Sophist is another late Platonic dialogue, where the propositions of the called
“friends of ideas”[37] are proved to be insufficient. The stranger here, playing perhaps
the role of Plato himself, shows that it is quite unreasonable to consider ideas as
absolute still entities, since the truly ‘being’ is characterized by movement and life[38].
In conclusion the stranger proves the Phaedrus-Platonic position clearly insufficient,
introducing a synthetic opinion, bridging the Eleatic school of invariable substance with
the Ionian school of dynamic change.
Later, Aristotle continues the critique against the ontological separability of the
ideas in respect to the objects, saying “But while they involve difficulty in many
respects, not the least absurdity is the doctrine that there are certain entities apart from
those in the sensible universe, and that these are the same as sensible things except in
that the former are eternal and the latter perishable. For [Platonists] say nothing more or
less than that there is an absolute Man, and Horse, and Health; in which they closely
resemble those who state that there are Gods, but of human form; for as the latter
invented nothing more or less than eternal men, so the former simply make the Forms
eternal sensibles.”[39].
In spite of the difficulties of philosophical grounding of Phaedrus-Platonic
position, both late Plato in Sophist, and Aristotle in his works concerning logic, adopt
the model of successive classes (Sophist-Platonic model), at least as a tool, due to the
efficiency of the taxonomic organization in hierarchical classes of concepts, in various
theoretical considerations. The relationship covering all the extension of this scheme is
the BT/NT (broader term / narrower term) relationship, where a term-concept is included
in the depth of another term-concept. For example every eagle is a bird, but a bird is not
necessarily eagle.
Additionally, we can identify the objects of our environment through the classconcept it belongs to, saying that a certain person is a human being, a certain dog is a
dog, a certain flower is a flower of a specific category, a certain table is a table, a certain
car is a car of a specific brand. This is the instance_of relationship developed by Aristotle
in the various types of syllogism. It means that a real object is an instance of the general
concept.
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Walking a step further we can make thesauri, richer schemes than taxonomies,
where we can impose apart from the BT/NT relationship between terms of the same
hierarchy, the associative or related term (RT) relationship, connecting relative terms
across hierarchies. RT relationship is frequently used for the assignment of the relation
between an object and its properties (has relationship); for example the terms poison and
toxicity.
There is also the equivalence relationship, where two terms mean exactly the same
thing under different names or abbreviations (e.g. beast and animal or United Nations
and UN). The equivalence is denoted by the USE and UF (used for) fields, where USE
offers to an unauthorized term a link to the corresponding authorized equivalent term
and UF accompanies an authorized term with all the equivalent unauthorized terms,
that could be used in place of the current term. Other useful relationships are part_of
relationship in case of an entity being part of another one (e.g. finger and hand) and
member_of relationship in case of an entity being member of a set (e.g. a footballer of a
football group).
Both BT/NT and equivalence relationships have the form subject – is – predicate.
They are presented in detail in Sophist, where a lot of conversation was spent in order to
discern the exact type of relationship between primary concepts like being, one and
whole. BT/NT relationship is implied under the expressions ‘possessing the attribute of’ or
‘imposed upon’ or ‘participating’ (Greek terms: πεπονθός, πάθος ἔχειν, μετέχειν), and
sometimes by the expression ‘being in a way’, (Greek expression: εἶναί πως); instead
equivalence relationship is given through the expression ‘the same to’ (Greek term
ταὐτόν).
The conversation takes place between the stranger from Elea holding new radical
philosophical opinions (echoing possibly the beliefs of late Plato) and Theaetetus,
representing the supporters of the traditional Phaedrus-Platonic position.
The stranger asks Theaetetus “will they say that the whole is other than the one
which exists or the same with it?”[40]. Here he wonders if ‘one’ and ‘whole’ are related
through the equivalence relation, as we conclude by the use of the phrase ‘the same
with’.
Next the stranger says “nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the
attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all and whole”[41].
Here he supports that “what has parts” is “one” in a BT/NT relationship between one
(BT) and what has parts (NT); this is implied through the expression ‘possessing the
attribute of’ (Greek term: πάθος ἔχειν). He ensures next about the type of the
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relationship, saying that “But such a unity consisting of many parts will not harmonize
with reason”[42], meaning that ‘what consists of many parts’ is not equivalent with
‘unity’ (the one). He concludes with a saying, which in my opinion is the earliest clear
declaration discerning the two ways of predication, BT/NT and equivalence: “for being,
having in a way had unity imposed upon it, will evidently not be the same as
unity”[43]. He affirms BT/NT relationship between unity (the one) (BT) and being (NT)
through the expressions ‘imposed upon’ (Greek term πεπονθός) and ‘in a way’ (Greek
term πως). Additionally, he negates equivalence relationship between them through the
expression ‘not the same as’ (Greek term ταὐτόν).
It is interesting to conclude the attempts of Plato to define the relationships
between ‘one’, ‘being’ and ‘whole’, by referring Aristotle, who presents the
contradictory effects from considering being (Greek word εἶναι) and one (Greek word
ἕν) as predicates of substance (Greek word ὂν)[44].
Later, the stranger in Sophist says that the greatest genera are ‘being’ (Greek term
ὂν), ‘motion’ (Greek word κίνησις) and ‘rest’ (Greek word στάσις)[45]. It is important
to identify their relations under the words of the stranger. He declares explicitly that
‘motion’ is descendant of ‘being’, in saying “it is clear, then, that motion really [is not,
and also that it] is, since it participates to being”[46]. The term ‘participates’ (Greek
word μετέχει) shows the BT/NT relationship between ‘being’ (BT) and ‘motion’ (NT). I
suppose that the same holds for ‘rest’, the adversary of ‘motion’, since it similarly
participates to ‘being’. To make it even more clear the stranger says “According to its
own nature, then, being is neither at rest nor in motion”[47], where he might mean that
‘being’ is parent of ‘motion’ and ‘rest’, not a descendant of either, and thus either
‘motion’ or ‘rest’ cannot be predicated by ‘being’.
Next, the stranger concludes the introduction of classes, adding the supposed
class of ‘the same’ (Greek term ταὐτόν) and the supposed class of ‘other’ (Greek term
ἕτερον). I think that the characterization of ‘the same’ and ‘other’ as classes is somehow
misleading in the comprehension of the classification scheme. In my opinion, they do
not denote classes, but rather types of relationship. ‘The same’ denotes equivalence
relationship, while ‘other’ denotes two disjoint classes. This suggestion might be
supported by the saying “certainly motion and rest are neither other nor the same”[48],
meaning that ‘motion’ and ‘rest’ refer to classes, while ‘other’ and ‘the same’ refer to
relationships. Similarly the obscure phrase “Then it [motion] is in a sense not other and
also other”[49] might mean that ‘motion’ can take part in either an equivalence
relationship related to itself or a disjoint relationship related with other disjoint terms.
And in the phrase mentioned before “it is clear, then, that motion really is not, and also
that it is, since it participates to being”, the first negation ‘motion really is not’ means, as
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the stranger explains, that ‘motion’ participates to the nature of ‘other’; to use the
relationship terminology, it means that ‘motion’ takes part in relationships with disjoint
terms.
Lastly, the stranger gives an excellent description of the object of the science of
dialectics, with the remark that “some of the classes will mingle with one another, and
others will not, and some will mingle with few and others with many, and that there is
nothing to hinder some from mingling universally with all”[50], meaning that the
amplitude of predication process (mingling) of concepts depends on their position in
the taxonomy.
3. Web as an extended-Platonic model
The relationships examined in the previous chapter are the foundations of
thesauri systems, which are used widely for effective literal and semantic search and
retrieval in the context of texts of a natural language or more usually in the case of a
sub-language.
The simple ontological taxonomy is the primitive Sophist-Platonic model of
classes interrelated by the BT/NT relationship. The universe of discourse, namely the
field of application of this model covers the whole natural environment. Each object of
the universe can be connected to a relative concept of the taxonomy, under an
instance_of relationship; all the individuals are connected to the concept of human
being, all the dogs to the concept of dog etc. Could a taxonomy be used for
identification purposes? The degree of identification would depend on the classification
detail. If the taxonomy ended with the class ‘dog’, we would not be able to identify a
certain dog as belonging to a specific race.
Let focus now on the world wide web (www), the universe of interconnected
web hypertext pages containing rich text, multimedia data and connections to other
pages. Web page management information system includes: (1) index tables
automatically derived by software (robot or crawler programs), where the
representative indices are keywords extracted from the title, the description, the text or
the content declaration fields of the web pages and (2) hierarchies (directories) of
thematic categories, where the representative categories have been defined by human
beings, based on various semantic views of the content. Therefore, directories are fewer
but superior to index tables in terms of content quality.
I consider web as the universe of discourse instead of the natural environment,
web pages as the objects of the material world accessed in screen or printed form by our
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senses, and keywords, extracted from or related to the pages, as the entities of the nonmaterial Platonic world. This model could be viewed as an extended Platonic model. I
keep the term ‘Platonic’ to remind that the representative keywords (indices or thematic
categories) of the web pages constitute a level different from the level of pages
(metadata distinguished from data). Additionally, I put the term ‘extended’ to remark
that this model has a more complicate structure in comparison to the primitive SophistPlatonic model.
At first I want to refer to the issue of priority. Plato, as I mentioned before,
supported that ideas are prior to the objects and they exist absolutely, independently of
the objects that depend and participate to them. Aristotle tried to increase the
importance of the sensible objects, saying that each object includes both form (pattern
idea) and matter. Later, Alexander Afrodisiensis, the most important annotator of
Aristotle, supported that the genera (Greek word καθόλου) are human noetic
constructions extracted from the common properties of certain groups of individuals
(Greek word καθέκαστα). He contended that the individuals are prior to the genera,
which are not self-existent entities, but concepts derived and existing only in human
mind. Similarly, in web, keywords (indices or thematic categories) are obviously
posterior to the texts, since they are either extracted from the text (indices) or they are
made according to the text (categories).
A critical feature of the web model is the multiplicity of connections between an
object of the web page world to the keywords of the Platonic world. Instead of the
unary relation between a material object and the corresponding idea in the SophistPlatonic model, a web page is related to a set of literal keywords stored in the index
tables, as well as to a set of thematic categories. Additionally, the hierarchies of
categories consist of concepts organized through BT/NT, equivalence and RT
relationships, while primitive Sophist-Platonic model was restricted to BT/NT
relationship. Lastly, web management search services use extensively the USE and UF
correspondence tools.
The more the connections between web pages (material objects) and keywords
(non-material concepts), the more the recall of the retrieved pages. The richer the
semantic hierarchies of categories, the more the precision of the retrieved pages.
Such a structure explains also the superiority of fuzzy matching to exact
matching. In the latter we do locate an object through a fixed correspondence to a
certain characteristic; in the former we try to locate it based on a multitude of
components with various weights.
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Conclusion
This work was an attempt at exploiting the Platonic model as a tool to face the
fundamental issue of the nature of digital information, as well as localization and
classification issues. As far as classification is concerned I tried to present a review of
the traditional Sophist-Platonic model through the words of early and late Plato in
terms of contemporary relationship schemes. A thorough examination of the
predicative propositions included in Sophist results to an informational view of the
ontological theory of late Plato. Lastly, I tried to interpret the structure of web
management system as an extended Platonic model. I hope that this study will be a
contribution to reveal the diachronic validity of ancient philosophical sayings, when
viewed under contemporary information contexts.
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